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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No.  06-3674
                              
NARENDRA PAPAIYA;
KAILAS PAPAIYA,
Appellants
v.
CITY OF UNION CITY; MAYOR BRIAN P. STACK, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LUIS MIRANDA, UNION FIRE OFFICIAL INDIVIDUALLY
AND HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; ALEX VELASQUEZ, BUILDING DEPARTMENT
INSPECTOR; MARTIN MARTINOTTI, UNION CITY BUILDING OFFICIAL,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; POLICE OFFICER BADGE
NO. 93 OF THE UNION CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; JOHN DOE (1 THRU 10), BEING A FICTITIOUS
DESIGNATION OF ONE OR MORE OFFICIALS OF THE CITY OF UNION CITY,
ACTING INDIVIDUALLY OR IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY
                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-02722)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 12, 2007
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 14, 2007)
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OPINION 
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Narendra and Kailas Papaiya appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
City of Union, New Jersey, Brian Stack, Martin Martinetti, Alejandro Velasquez, and
Luis Miranda (collectively “defendants”).  The Papaiyas contend that a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether defendants violated their constitutional rights by
depriving them of their property after City officials closed the Papaiyas’ residential
apartment buildings for public health violations.  Given the undisputed facts in the record
that unsafe conditions on the Papaiyas’ property warranted the action of the City officials,
we affirm the order granting summary judgment for the defendants.
Facts and Procedural History
As we write for the parties, only a brief summary of the pertinent facts is necessary.
The Papaiyas owned and operated residential apartment buildings located at 806-808 22nd
Street in Union City.  On March 4, 2005, police and fire officials arrived at the property after
being alerted that eight tenants had complained of headaches and dizziness, possible
symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning.  Public Service Electric and Gas tested the
buildings and concluded that there was a high reading of carbon monoxide, warranting the
shutting down of gas services.  
     These notices also informed the Papaiyas of their right to an immediate administrative1
appeal of the orders to the Hudson County Construction Board.  They did not exercise
this right.
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The Union City Health Department, Fire Bureau, and Construction Department also
conducted inspections of the property, finding numerous health and safety violations.  Due
to the high levels of carbon monoxide, cemented and plugged flu vents, electrical hazards,
and sewage in the basement, the health, fire, and construction officials determined the
buildings to be unsafe for human habitation.  These violations warranted the issuance of two
Notices of Imminent Hazard and Orders to take Corrective Action, a Punitive Closing Order,
and a Notice of Unsafe Structure under the New Jersey Administrative Code §§ 5:70-2.16,
5:70-2.18 & 5:23-2.32.  These orders stipulated that the property must be vacated and closed
until the unsafe conditions were abated.1
The Papaiyas did not effectively apply for any building permits, did not submit any
plans to correct the violations, and have not filed them.  Instead, they filed an action in state
court against the defendants, claiming violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The defendants removed the suit to federal court.  Both the defendants and the Papaiyas
made motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  The District Judge granted the defendants’ motion and denied that of the
Papaiyas.  They appeal.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Because this is an
appeal from a final judgment of a district court, we have appellate jurisdiction under 28
     On appeal, the defendants contend that we lack subject matter jurisdiction because the2
Papaiyas’ failure to exhaust New Jersey's administrative remedies caused their claim to
lack ripeness.  We disagree.  An administrative action must be final before it is judicially
reviewable.  Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 192 (1985).  In this case, the orders issued by the City officials were
final administrative actions because the “initial decisionmaker[s]” came to a definitive
decision regarding the property that “inflict[ed] an actual, concrete injury” on the
Papaiyas.  Id. at 193.  Moreover, even though the Papaiyas did not exhaust these state
remedies, their claim does not lack ripeness because  the exhaustion of state remedies is
not a prerequisite to bringing an action under § 1983.  Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457
U.S. 496, 516 (1982).   
     Section 1983 in relevant part provides:3
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
4
U.S.C. § 1291.2
Discussion
A trial court grants summary judgment only if the record, viewed with all inferences
in favor of the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Our
review of grants of summary judgment is plenary.  Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463,
466 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 832-833 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Therefore, we apply the same approach, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), as the
District Court.
The Papaiyas argue that the deprivation of their property by the city officials violated
their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, allowing them to bring
claims under § 1983.   To be successful on this challenge, the Papaiyas must show that the3
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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actions of the officials “shock[] the conscience.”  County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 846 (1998) (noting that only the most egregious government conduct is constitutionally
arbitrary and violates due process).  The Papaiyas additionally contend that they have
presented a valid conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).  Because § 1985 does not
itself create any substantive rights but acts as a “vehicle to vindicate [other] federal rights and
privileges,” the Papaiyas first must establish a violation of their constitutional rights in order
to have a successful § 1985 claim.  Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 805 (3d Cir.
2001).
The defendants respond by arguing that the unsafe and unhealthy conditions of the
Papaiyas’ property justified the actions taken by the government officials.  As such, their
behavior in no way “shocks the conscience.”  Furthermore, they contend that the City
officials should have been shielded from this litigation by qualified immunity.  Under the
doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”  Harrow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  
The District Court ably analyzed the relevant claims in reaching its conclusion that
     The Papaiyas also contend that the City engaged in a physical taking of their property4
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  This claim
underwhelms.  The City did not physically take the Papaiyas’ property or physically
trespass on the property in a permanent way.  It was merely regulating the use of the
premises for the legitimate purpose of maintaining safe and healthy living conditions for
its citizens.  Moreover, if the Papaiyas had fixed the code violations, they could have
rented the apartments or sold the buildings.  The Supreme Court has held that “land-use
regulation does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’
and does ‘not den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.’”  Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980)).
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defendants were entitled to summary judgment.  The undisputed evidence demonstrates that
the Papaiyas’ property contained numerous health and safety violations.  The actions taken
by the City officials were no doubt warranted; thus, their behavior hardly “shocks the
conscience” and did not result in a violation of the Papaiyas’ substantive due process rights.
In this context, we need not reach the other issues appealed, as they lack the critical
underpinning of a constitutional violation.  Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the District
Court’s opinion granting summary judgment, we affirm.4
